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Dunlay and Pavarini: Managed Competition

MANAGED COMPETITION THEORY AS A
BASIS FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM

by
CATHERINE T. DUNLAY & PErER A. PAVARINI*
INTRODUCTION

Health care reform, both nationally and at the state level, has been in the spotlight
for several months, but it is clear that we are far from consensus concerning the appro-

priate plan foreffecting reform. "Managed competition" has been heralded in the media
as an approach most likely to be capable of developing consensus and, based on President Clinton's campaign materials and early reports from the White House Task Force
on Health Care Reform (the "Task Force"), it was widely expected that the reform

program proposed by the ClintonAdministration would be a derivative of that economic
model. More recently, the Clinton Administration has taken the position that its plan is
not managed competition -but it is clear that many elements of that model remain a part
of the Administration's plan.
In addition to the attention atthe federal level, a number of states seeking to develop
health care reform plans are studying managed competition. Florida, Minnesota and
Washington have enacted legislation containing elements of managed competition, as
discussed below.' Managed competition legislation has been considered in a number of
other states. For example, in California the "Garamendi plan," which combines managed competition with a global budget, passed the state legislature but was vetoed by the
Governor in 1992.2
In light of the large amount of attention it has received from federal and state
officials, managed competition can be expected to have an effect on the evolution of the
health care system, even if no pure managed competition reform proposal is legislatively
enacted. In fact, the attention given to managed competition and the widespread expectation that a reform model based on managed competition would be enacted may have
already had an effect in accelerating a movement among health care providers to form
more integrated delivery systems. Thus, this article will seek to explain the fundamental
principles of managed competition and the basic features of reform based on managed
competition. It will also examine some of the criticisms of managed competition and
the practical and legal impediments that will be faced in seeking to reform the health care
industry based upon managed competition theory.
. Ms. Dunlay and Mr. Pavarini are both principals in, and Mr. Pavarini is chair of, the Health Law Department of
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, a Columbus, Ohio law firm. The authors gratefully acknowledge the capable research
assistance of Nancy A. Brigner and Thomas H. Mallory.
See infra pp. 26-33.
2 See California ConsideredLikely ModelforNational Reform, Conf Told, I HEALTHCAREPoLCYREPoRT501
(May 17, 1993).
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BASIC THEORY AND GOALS

The underpinning of managed competition is that the benefits of effective competition - whereby suppliers compete on the basis of providing maximum value for the
consumer's dollar - are not present in the current health care system. Thus, the system

must be reorganized and managed so that an efficientmarket promoting such "value-formoney" competition among health plans can be achieved.4 To achieve this goal, managed competition seeks to restructure the methods by which health care is purchased and
paid for, and to do so in a way that causes the providers delivering health care to
reorganize into more cost-conscious and quality-conscious delivery systems.' To understand the rationale for such a reorganization, an understanding of the flaws of the current
6
system from a competitive viewpoint is essential.
WHY THE CURRENT MARKET STRUCTURE
DOES NOT FOSTER VALUE-FOR-MONEY COMPETITION
Proponents of managed competition point to several reasons why the current market
has failed to produce value-for-money competition.7 These criticisms apply primarily
to the traditional system of fee-for-service providers receiving reimbursement through
insurance plans paid for by employers.8 Although industry changes in recent years,
including an increased tendency of employers to shift part of the cost of health benefits
to employees, development of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred
provider organizations (PPOs) and other managed care organizations, and an increasing
tendency of large employers to seek direct contracts with providers, may mean that the
criticisms are not applicable to all aspects of the current market, the market has not
changed to a point where these criticisms are no longer applicable. In fact, the changes
cited above are precursors to the type of system managed competition would seek to create.
Advocates of managed competition have identified the following as sources of
market failure under the current system:9

'

Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles ofManaged Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24,25.
See id.
I See Paul Starr & WalterA. Zelman,A Bridge to Compromise: Competition UnderA Budget, HEALTH AFF., Supp.
1993, at 7. 11.
' See Enthoven, supra note 3.
7
Id.
4

9 Id. at 25-26.
9 See, e.g., Paul M. Ellwood et al., The Jackson Hole Initiativesfor a Twenty-First Century American Health Care
System, 1 HEALTH ECON. 149, 155 (1992).
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Cost-UnconsciousDemand
One of the most fundamental problems under the current system is that the parties
making decisions about utilization of health care services are not the parties who bear
the economic risks of those decisions. Employees covered by indemnity insurance paid
for by their employers have little incentive to be cost-conscious in their selection of
health care providers. Further, the determination of services to be provided and choice
of provider are often made by the employee's physician, rather than by the employee
himself or herself. This is particularly problematic since the economic incentive for
physicians paid on a fee-for-service basis is actually to provide more services and, thus,
receive more payment, rather than to make careful cost-benefit analyses in choosing the
services to be provided. The problem is exacerbated even further by the physicians'
concern that they must practice defensive medicine to avoid malpractice liability. Last,
the tradition of employers making payment for premiums under health insurance plans,
coupled with the tax-free nature of those payments under federal income tax laws, results
in a lack ofcost sensitivity of employees, and reduced cost sensitivity of employers (who
receive a deduction for the premiums regardless of their amount), in choosing health plans.
Lack of Information
To the extent that employees and employers seek to make price and value-conscious
decisions concerning health plans and health services, they are hampered by a lack of
infornation, particularly conceming the comparative quality of health outcomes. Thus,
there is likely to be reluctance in choosing a lower priced plan because of the inability
to obtain assurance that the plan provides adequate quality. In addition, the vast array
of different benefit designs offered by insurers and managed care organizations makes
comparison of different plans extremely difficult.
Limits of Individual Choice
Many employers are not large enough to offer employees a multiple choice of plans,
thus limiting the employees to the limited selections made by the employer. An employer
offering a less expensive managed care plan in addition to a traditional indemnity plan
may find the employees choosing the indemnity plan because their physicians are not
participants in the particular managed care plan selected by the employer. Further, a
switch by the employer from a more costly to a less costly benefit plan is likely to be
difficult since all of the employees will be affected by the switch.
CompetitionAmong Health PlansNot Based on Value-For-Money
Competition among insurers and managed care organizations is characterized by
factors other than value-for-money competition, most notably risk selection and market
segmentation. Risk selection refers to the process by which insurers and managed care
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organizations seek to enroll healthy people and avoid high risk enrollees who will
generate high costs. Insurers seek, through underwriting practices and premium pricing,
to avoid insuring those who will generate a disproportionately high amount of claims.
Risk selection is also accomplished by designing benefits in a manner calculated to
attract healthier enrollees and discourage the unhealthy. Market segmentation is accomplished primarily through benefit design. By offering different types of coverage, different plans may attract different types of enrollees, thus reducing the extent to which the
plans compete based on price in attracting the enrollees.
CompetitionAmong ProvidersNot Based on Value-For-Money
Because of the cost-unconscious nature of demand as described above, price often
is not dominant in competition between providers. For example, hospitals compete on
services and technologies available and on amenities offered to patients and physicians,
even though this may cause increased costs, since patients and physicians are not the
parties affected by the costs, although they are the parties making the decisions.10 With
competition on this basis, it should not be surprising that there is duplicative expenditure

by hospitals on expensive technology.
Proponents of managed competition also criticize the current methods of providing
care to the uninsured through Medicaid and provision of charity care by health care
providers." Under these current methods, health care for the uninsured is likely to be
delayed until health problems are more serious, and care is frequently provided in costly
settings, specifically hospital emergency rooms.' 2 Further, high administrative costs are
incurred because of the need to determine eligibility of patients for such care, and the
dollars lost by health care providers in providing such care are recovered through increased charges to insured patients, a process known as cost-shifting. Through cost-shifting,
the cost of providing care to the uninsured is borne in an uneven, unregulated manner by the
insurd.13
BASIC FEATURES OF A MANAGED COMPETITION SYSTEM
Managed competition has been the springboard for many national health reform
proposals - including the proposal of the Jackson Hole Group, the Managed Competition
Act of 1992 proposed by the Conservative Democratic Forum, and the reform model
outlined in President Clinton's campaign. 14 These and other managed competition
"

Jonathan E. Fielding&ThomasRiceCanManagedCompetition
SolvetheProblemrofMarketFailure?,
HEALTH

AFF., Supp. 1993, at 216,220-21.
n Enthoven, supra note 3, at 41.
12 Id.
o1 See id.
14

See InsuranceIndustry GovernorsAdopt HealthCare Policies:Debate Intensifies, 1 HEALTH LAW REP.

351 (Dec. 10, 1992).
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reform proposals contain varying provisions and, thus, if each proposal is viewed as
constituting managed competition it will be impossible to define one cohesive theory.
This may be one reason that there has been considerable public confusion over what
managed competition means.
For purposes of this discussion, the elements of managed competition will be defined primarily as those identified by Professor Alain Enthoven, who developed the
concept in the late 1970's (building on earlier efforts of Scott Hemming and others) and
has refined the concept in various writings since that time.'5 For this reason, when
drawing upon a specific proposal for governmental health care reform, we will draw
primarily upon the proposal of the Jackson Hole Group, in which Professor Enthoven
participated, although contrary views of other analysts and elements of other reform
proposals, including the September 1993 draft of the Clinton Administration proposal
(hereinafter referred to as the "Clinton Proposal') will also be referenced.
For purposes of our analysis, we have grouped what could be described as many
different elements of managed competition into three key features: creation of a costconscious purchaser of health plans with significant market power, organization of
health plans and structure of their relationship with health plan purchasers so that the
purchasers can most effectively manage competition among the plans; and provision of
incentives to individual consumers so that they will make cost-conscious decisions in
choosing health plans. Each of these key features, and theirmore-detailed components,
are discussed below.
Sponsors andPurchasingCooperatives
Purchasing cooperatives are probably the one element that is present in all proposals
described as managed competition proposals. Before discussing cooperatives, however,
the concept of a sponsor should be described since a purchasing cooperative is one type
of sponsor. Sponsors are those who purchase health benefits on behalf of a group and
assume the role of actively managing competition among health plans for that group.' 6
Examples of sponsors in the current market include employers and government agencies.' 7 The purchasing cooperative is the mechanism by which those purchasers without
sufficient size or market power to act effectively as sponsors are represented by an entity
with the necessary size and power.'8 (Such cooperatives are dubbed health insurance

Us See id. at 24.
16 Id. at 30.
Id.

17
"

Id. at 35.
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purchasing cooperatives, or HIPCs, by Professor Enthoven; health plan purchasing
cooperatives, or HPPCs, by the Conservative Democratic Forum; and health alliances
9
by the Clinton Administration. We will refer to them hereafter as HIPCs.)
Sponsors, including HIPCs, would perform many important functions in a managed
competition system: actively negotiating and contracting with health plans; gathering
information on the health plans and disseminating it among customers in the HIPC;
monitoring the behavior of health plans and HIPC participants to eliminate risk selective
behavior, market segmentation and other noncompetitive practices; administering all of
the health benefit contracts; and acting as the point of entry for managing enrollment.20
Sponsors are the first level at which health plans would compete, since a contract with
would be available as a possible
the sponsor would be necessary before the health plan
21
sponsor.
that
by
represented
consumers
for
choice
Employers are the most prevalent purchasers of health benefits, but most are not
large enough to effectively manage competition and efficiently perform the functions
described above.? Thus, HIPCs would be formed to represent those employers and their
employees.23 Such HIPCs must be "large enough to spread risk, achieve economies of
scale, offer choice of plan at the individual subscriber level, and manage competition effectively."'
HIPCs would not be risk-bearing entities and would not have their own plans, since
they are intended to be impartial brokers promoting the interests of their participating
consumers?25 HIPCs would contract with employers and would be required to accept all
employers in their area. 6 To avoid risk selection by the HIPCs, they would be prohibited
from excluding groups or individuals based on health considerations. 2 Further, strong
incentives or mandates would be provided foremployers to participate in HIPCs.6 Such
incentives or mandates would be necessary to prevent adverse selection from saddling
the HIPC with an unbalanced, poor risk pool as a result of employers that have favorable
claims experience, and thus benefit from experience rating, opting out of the HIPC.

19

Id. at 37.

20 Id. at 35-37.
21 See id. at 30-31.
2
23
21
25
26
27
n

Id. at 35.
Id.
Ellwood et al., supra note 9, at 150.
Enthoven, supra note 3, at 36-37.
Id. at 36.
Id.
See id. at 37.
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Each HIPC would contract with anumber of different health plans so that individual
consumers sponsored by that HIPC would have the ability to choose among those plans.
Thus, the individual would not be limited to the limited number of plan options that a
small employer would provide and could exercise choice independently of other employees of his or her particular employer.
The appropriate structure for HIPCs is a subject for debate. Professor Enthoven and
the Jackson Hole Group described HIPCs as nonprofit membership corporations with
boards elected by the participating employers 9 The Conservative Democratic Forum
also would structureHIPCs as nonprofit corporations, but theboards would be appointed
by the state governors? Under the Clinton Proposal, states may determine whethertheir
HIPCs will be non-profit corporations, independent state agencies or agencies of the
state executive branch, and may establish the mechanism for selecting HIPC boards.3
The California Public Employees' RetirementSystem ("CalPERS"), as administrator of a health benefit program for employees of the State of California and other public
agencies in that state, is cited as an example of an existing entity that functions much as
an HIPC.32 CalPERS has over 750 public employers participating in its health benefits
program, with a total of over 875,000 covered lives.3 3 The CalPERS board consists of
thirteen members: six elected by consumers, five representing participating employers,
and two appointed by the governor and the state legislature?4 Participating agencies are
prohibited from restricting enrollment due to pre-existing conditions, age or sex, and
there is no waiting period for coverage. 5 CalPERS negotiates and contracts with health

plans, performs all administrative functions, collects data concerning cost and quality,
distributes information to consumers, and conducts an annual open enrollment period
for plan selection. 36 CalPERS contracts with a number of HMOs 37 and offers self38
funded PPO plans.

Id. See also Ellwood et al., supra note 9,at 157.
o Fora more complete discussion of govemance and design of HIPCs, see Paul Starr, Design ofHealth Insurance
PurchasingCooperativesHEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 58; Walter A. Zelman, Who Should Govern the Purchasing
Cooperative?,HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 49.
11 See ClintonAdministrationDescriptionof President'sHealth CareReform Plan,"American Health Security Act
of 1993." 1 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 55 (Sept. 13, 1993) [hereinafter President'sHealth Care Reform].
32 See CaliforniaRetirementSystem Holds 1993 PremiumIncreasesto 1.4 Percent, 1 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA)
21 (Mar. 8. 1993).
11 See Achieving Effective Cost Control in ComprehensiveHealth Care Reform: Hearings on S. 955 Before the
Comm. on Labor and Hwnan Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1992) (testimony of Tom .Elkin).
Id.

Id. at 121.
36 Id.
17 Id.at 123.
Is

13 Id.at 126.
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CalPERS negotiates aggressively with healthplans and uses cost data obtained from
the plans in its negotiations. 9 Because it found multiple plan designs were adversely
affecting its ability to provide understandable information to consumers and to negotiate
premiums with the plans, it instituted a uniform benefit program effective for the 1993
- 1994 contract year, which it found has simplified the premium negotiations process and
enhanced competition between health plans.40 Forthe 1993 - 94 contract year, CalPERS
was able to limit its overall health benefit premium increase to 1.4%, which is signifi41
cantly less than the 12.1% projected increase in national health expenditures. HMO
premiums actually decreased by 0.4%, which was offset by a 7.9% increase in rates
for the PPO plans. 42
ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH PLANS AND STRUCTURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP
WITH SPONSORS
Under managed competition, a number of devices would be used to enhance competition among health plans on the basis of price and quality, and to avoid risk selection

and market segmentation.
InsuranceMarketReforms
Under managed competition, certain restrictions would apply to all health plans
offered to consumers sponsored by an HIPC or other sponsor. To prevent risk selection,

all sponsored consumers would have to be given access to coverage in an annual open
enrollment conducted by the sponsor." The health plans would be required to accept all
participating consumers who chose that plan." Exclusion of coverage for pre-existing
conditions would be prohibited, and the employees would receive continuous coverage;

cancellation or nonrenewal for health reasons would not be permitted.' All enrollees
would be charged a community rated premium, and experience rating would not be

permitted. To discourage risk selection and ensure the viability of plans in which a
disproportionately large number of high-risk consumers enroll, the HIPC would, how-

ever, impose a surcharge on health plans that receive the benefits of favorable selection
and subsidize those that receive unfavorable selection.

Id. at 122.

Id. at 124-25.
4" See President's Health Care Reform. supra note 31.
"1 See Purchasing Cooperatives Report Success Using UniformBeneflitPaclages, 1Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA)

300 (Apr. 19, 1993).
See Enthoven. supra note 3, at 32-35.
Id. at 33.
4 Id.
'3

"

See id. at 36.
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StandardBenefit Package
All health plans would be required to offer a standard benefit package, for several
reasons. First, if universal coverage is to be achieved, as discussed below, it will be
essential to establish the nature of the coverage to which everyone is entitled. Second,
use of the standard benefit package will enhance comparability of the plans, thus enabling the sponsors to negotiate more effectively with the plans and making it possible
for consumers to make informed choices between plans. Complex and varied benefit
structures would make it very difficult for consumers to determine which plans provide
the bestvalue, and would require more time indecisionmaking than consumers are likely
to be willing to spend. Last, a requirement for a standard benefit package is intended to
prevent plans from using benefit design as a risk selection mechanism.
Provisionof Cost and Quality Data
All health plans would b required to capture data on the quality and cost of
services provided by them and provide that data to the sponsors. Sponsors would
then gather that information, use it in their negotiations with health plans, and
present it to consumers to enable them to make informed decisions. The intended
result is that high quality, cost effective plans will be rewarded with increased
enrollment and therefore, plans will be encouraged to develop quality and cost
effectiveness.
UniversalCoverage
Because the current methods for providing care to the uninsured are considered by
managed care proponents to lead to delayed care, care in costly settings, costly eligibility
determinations and cost-shifting, reform of this system is considered a necessary component of managed competition.' This is especially important since managed
competition's restructuring of the market to increase competition would be likely to
reduce the ability of providers to engage in cost-shifting to cover care for the uninsured.
Thus, the pressure placed on providers to cut theircosts could have the effect of reducing
access to care for the uninsured. Further, some consider universal coverage to be necessary to prevent adverse selection from undermining the system because of the election
by healthier individuals not to participate.4
Reform proposals obviously need to address how universal coverage can be achieved
and funded, and Professor Enthoven describes this as something that could be achieved
in a variety of ways, including employer mandates, individual mandates and taxes.49
'7

ld.at41.

" WilliamnCuster.HealthCareReform:MznagedConmpe*inandBeyondEMPLoYEEBENErrREsEARcHINsT.,
Issue Brief No. 135, at 9 (Mar. 1993) [herinafter EBRI].
Enthoven, supra note 3, at 42.
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Under the Jackson Hole Group proposal, all employers would be mandated to cover all
full-time employees with a defined employer contribution of 50 to 100 percent of the
price of the lowest price standard benefit package available through the applicable
sponsor.5 Under the Clinton Proposal, employers are required to pay 80% of the
average-priced plan for their employees and all individuals ae required to purchase
coverage, with subsidies for some small businesses and for low income individuals
51
provided by the federal government.
Divisionof ProvidersInto Competing Economic Units
One of the features central to Professor Enthoven's proposal, but highly controversial, is the division of providers into competing, risk-bearing economic units. Under the
theories advanced by Professor Enthoven, providers can best be encouraged to develop
higher quality and more cost effective methods of delivering health care if they are
divided into competing, risk-bearing units. If all of the health plans offered by a HIPC
have open panels and include the same pool of providers, the plans will have neither the
necessary bargaining power with providers to hold down costs nor the necessary relationship with providers so that selection of one health plan over another is based on the
quality of the providers in that plan. Because the competition focused upon by managed
competition is the competition among the health plans, which is the level at which
consumers are more likely to be able to understand costs and be motivated to reduce those
costs, it is essential that the insurance and health care service functions be integrated.
Otherwise, the desired effect on health care providers will not be achieved. Managed
competition is intended to encourage creation of systems of providers that can monitor
quality, have incentives to engage in cost-effective innovation, and match resources of
personnel and facilities to meet the needs of the enrollees.
Under both the Jackson Hole Group proposal and the Conservative Democratic
Forum proposal, accountable health plans would be created to fulfill these functions.
These accountable health plans, or"AHPs", would be organizations that integrate insurance and health cam delivery, deliver the full array of standard benefits and report cost
and quality information. They would be required to registerwith, and would be regulated
by, a national board. The Jackson Hole Group proposal envisions suchAHPs as possibly
consisting of either single, vertically integrated organizations of providers and insurers,
or affiliations of independent provider and insurance organizations working
collaboratively 2 Only coverage from AHPs would be entitled to favorable tax treatment
under the Jackson Hole Group proposal. 53

"
'

s

Ellwood et al., supranote 9, at 160.
President's Health Care Reform, supra note 31, at Supp. pp. 220-35.
Ellwood et al., supra note 9, at 153-54.
Id. at 162.
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Under the Clinton Proposal, only state-certified health plans would be permitted to
provide health benefits to HIPCs, and those health plans would also be required to meet
federal standards with respectto such matters as fiscal soundness, practitionercredentialing
and utilization management, among othermatters. Fee-for-service health plans, which
do not integrate insurance and health care delivery, ae retained under the Clinton Proposal. In fact, HIPCs are required to make at least one fee-for-service plan available
to their participants. 55
Professor Enthoven has criticized inclusion of indemnity plans as being irreconcilable with a managed competition system because of the lack of a contractual relationship
between payer and provider under indemnity insurance.56 Without that relationship, the
quality of services could not form the basis of comparison for choosing between health
plans as intended under the managed competition system.Y
EncourageIndividualConsumers to Make Cost-ConsciousDecisions
Under managed competition, the HIPCs would choose the participating health
plans, but the final choice among those plans would be left to consumers. It is important,
therefore, that consumers have an incentive to make cost-conscious decisions when
choosing among those plans. To encourage such cost-consciousness, the tax-free employercontribution to premiums would be limited to the amount of the lowest priced plan
in the HIPC offering the standard benefit package. Thus, enrollees would receive the full
benefit of choosing the less expensive plan, unaffected by tax subsidies, and the incentive
to plans for cutting prices would be increased. Further, because enrollees choosing a plan
other than the lowest price plan would experience at least some economic cost in doing
so, such a decision would presumably be made only if there was a quality feature of the
chosen plan making that cost worthwhile. Under the Clinton Proposal, all employer
contributions toward plans providing the standard benefit package are tax deductible to
the employer and not counted as income to the employee, without limiting the tax
deduction to the lowest-priced plan or to the 80% of average premiums that the employer
is required to pay.58
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND QUESTIONS
There are a number of important details that need to be decided upon in structuring
health care reform based upon a managed competition system. Accordingly, most
s

See President's Health Care Reform, supra note 31, at Supp. pp. 73-77.

ss

Id. at 61.

" See Clinton Should Scrap Plans to Allow Indemnity Insurance,Enhoven Urges, 1 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA)
296, 297 (Apr. 19, 1993).
s7 Id.
"

See President's Health Care Reform, supra note 31, at Supp. p. 239.
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reform proposals, including the Jackson Hole Group Proposal, the Conservative Democratic Forum proposal and the Clinton Proposal, require establishment of a national
agency to make many of the determinations, provide oversight to the HIPCs and/or
AHPs and otherwise to address implementation issues. Private sector boards that would
advise this national agency with respect to matters in their areas of expertise are also
contemplated under some of these proposals.
Certain of the issues that would need to be addressed by a legislature in passing
health reform legislation based on managed competition and by any govenmental
agency established under thatlegislation are discussed below, Also discussed below are
some of the impediments that will be faced in seeking to implement such reform
in today's market.
Issues Relating to Sponsors andHIPCs
One of the important questions concerning HIPCs will be the question of which
employers and individuals should be the subject of strong incentives or mandates for
participation. The more employers that are given the option of staying out of the HIPC,
the greater the potential is for adverse selection to negatively affect the HIPC.Y9 The
Jackson Hole Group proposal would make small group participation in a HIPC a condition for exclusion of the employer contribution from the employee's taxable income,
but defines a small group as 100 or fewer employees.6 The Conservative Democratic
Forum proposal allows firms with 1,000 or more employees to opt out ofthe HIPC, but
gives states the option of increasing that number to as much as 10,000.61 The Clinton

Proposal allows employers with more than 5,000 employees to opt out of the HIPC, but
such employers would then be regulated as "corporate alliances. '"2
Another question concerning HIPCs iSthe number of enrollees that must be in the
HIPC in order for it to obtain the desired economies of scale and operate effectively, but
not be so large that it becomes unmanageable or excessively political. A different, but
related question is the appropriate number of sponsors for any given geographical area,
and the size of the area to be covered by one sponsor. If more than one sponsor is
permitted in the same geographic area, the health plans may be able to engage in some
risk selection by differentiating between the sponsors. The existence of more than one
sponsor would also diminish the market power and negotiating strength of the sponsor.
On the other hand, if there is only one HIPC in a geographical area, that HIPC will be

Starr & Zelman, supra note 5, at 14-15.
EllWood et al., supra note 9, at 156.
61 H. R. 5936, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§105(a), 191(cX2)(1992).
a See President's Health Care Reform, supra note 31, at Supp. pp. 65-71.
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a monopsony purchaser. Some see this as a benefit since the HIPC could then use its
power to hold down prices, especially in sparsely populated areas where competition
between providers is unlikely.63 Questions are raised, however, about how to assure that
such a HIPC will act in the public interest" Theoretically, a HIPC as a monopsony
purchaser could hamper competition among providers by conspiring with one or more
providers, or could push prices so low that most providers are forced from the market,
leaving a monopoly. The American MedicalAssociation has taken the position that creation
of a HIPC as a monopsony purchaser would result in deterioration of quality and acess.1
Under the Clinton Proposal, states may establish the geographic areas for HIPCs
within their boundaries, but may establish only one HIPC in each area.6 Thus, it appears
thatthe ClintonAdministration considers the benefitofestablishing HIPCs as monopsony
purchasers to outweigh the potential risks.
STRUCTURE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEALTH PLANS AND HIPCS
InsuranceMarket Reform
One of the largest problems in restructuring the insurance market is determining
how to risk-adjust premiums paid to plans so that plans with low-risk enrollees will be
surcharged and plans with high risk enrollees will be subsidized. 6 There are currently
no good models available for that process.6 Questions that would have to be addressed
in creating such a model include determining what factors indicate various risks and
whether to make the determination prospectively, which would result in less accuracy,
or retroactively, which is likely to lessen the effectiveness of managed competition as an
incentive for the plan to be cost-effective. The Clinton Proposal provides for prospective
adjustment of payments under a risk-adjustment system to be developed by a National
Health Board.6 9
Another potential problem is that because all employers would pay equally under
community rating, the employer's incentive to maintain the health of its work force is
decreased. The economic benefits of a better experience rating because of a healthier

" See, e.g., Richard Kronick, Where Should the Buck Stop: Federal and State Responsibilities in Health Care
Financing Reform, HEALTh AFF., Supp. 1993, at 87, 90-91.
"
See Henry J. Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Managed Competition: Little Cost Containment Without Budget
Limits, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 204,209.
Applying Antitrust to Health Alliances, I Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 559 (May 6, 1993).
See President's Health Care Reform, supra note 31, at Supp. pp. 49-50.
See Enthoven, supra note 3, at 34.
SSee id.

See President's Health Care Reform, supra note 3 1, at Supp. p. 83.
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work force would not be obtained by employers under this system. Thus, the system may
have a negative effect on employer-sponsored wellness programs.
StandardBenefit Package
The determination of what is included in the standard benefit package will have
profound effects. This determination will affect directly the type of care that individuals
obtain. Ifthe standard benefit package excludes many types ofmedical care,the proposal
will be subject to charges that it results in rationing health care, leaving care not covered
by the standard benefit package available only to those financially able to purchase it.
If the package is very inclusive, cost is likely to be a problem. This determination also
will affect the income of various types of providers, favoring those whose services are
included and disfavoring others.
A number of questions would have to be addressed in establishing a standard benefit
package. These questions, which touch upon the areas of financing, consumer protection, governmental relations and quality maintenance, include what benefits are affordable, what information do consumers need to know about the benefits, at what level of
government should the benefits be prescribed, and how will required treatments be
defined and delivered.7' Other countries have found the determination of the content for
a standard benefit package to be difficult to make and have tended to push this decision
down to local levels of government.7' The ClintonProposal, however, establishes a fairly
inclusive benefit package and provides for adjustments to that package to be recommended to the President and Congress by a National Health Board.'
Information Gathering
Similar to the situation with respect to risk-adjusting premiums paid to plans, the
collection of quality information necessary under a managed competition system is not
feasible with current processes. Various groups have collected various types of quality
data concerning health care, but that data is not currently collected in any uniform fashion
and there is no broad consensus on what the pertinent information is for determining
situation is likely
quality of health care. It is expected that the uniqueness of each patient
73
difficult.
measures
quality
uniform
of
determination
to make the

" Linda A. Bergthold, Benefit Design Choices Under A Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 99.
EBRI, supra note 48, at 11.

71

See President's Health CareReform, supra note 31, at Supp. pp. 19-42.
See Shoshanna Sofaer, Informing andProltecting Consumers Under Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp.
1993, at 76 (discussing possible methods for providing information to consumers in HIPC).
2

73

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol27/iss2/3

14

Dunlay and Pavarini: Managed Competition

Fall, 19931

MANAGED COMPETIION

DividingProvidersInto Competing Units
This aspect of amanaged competition system, as envisioned by ProfessorEnthoven,
has led many to characterize managed competition as a system leading to the creation
of super HMOs and poor quality of care. These criticisms are further discussed below.
Further, as Enthoven envisions it, the most effective market will have totally separate networks of providers, without overlap. Such a system of providers will not be
feasible in sparsely populated areas. One study concludes that a population of 1.2 million
would be required to support three fully independent plans, and that 42% of the U.S.
population lives in such markets. 74 This study further concludes that a population of
360,000 could support three plans that are mostly independent, but share some hospital
facilities and contract for tertiary services. U.S. markets with such populations would
include 63% of the U.S. population.7 6 Last, the study concludes that three plans providing primary care and many basic specialty services, but sharing in-patient cardiology and
urology services, could be supported by a population of 180,000, which would include
71% of the U.S. population. 77
Professor Enthoven argues that in sparsely populated areas where there is not a
sufficient market for competing provider networks, the HIPC could rely on competition
for the field instead of in the field, an approach that clearly raises the monopsony issues
discussed above.7 As Professor Enthoven sees it, a HIPC in such an area might contract
with an established organization to establish and operate networks in the area or might
"reach through" the health plans and negotiate directly with the needed providers.79
Another question regarding the ability of the current market to support competitive
providernetworks is the question of whetherthere are sufficient primary care physicians
in practice, especially when one considers that universal coverage also will be sought.8°
It is the general consensus that there are too many specialists and not enough primary care
physicians in the current marketto support universal coverage undermanaged competition.1
Universal Coverage
Provision of universal coverage can clearly be expected to generate costs. One of
the most difficult issues politically is how to fund these costs. The suggestions of
74

Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reformr? 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 148, 150 (1993).

75

Id.

Id.
Id.
I Enthoven, supra note 3, at 39.
79
Id.
' See FitzhughMullanetal.,DoctorsDollars, andDetermination: MakingPhysician Work-ForcePolicy, HEALTH
AFF., Supp. 1993, at 138, 140-41.
" See, e., id. at 141.
76
77
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Professor Enthoven and the Jackson Hole Group that taxes or mandates be used may be
politically difficult to implement. Many question the effect of mandates on the financial
viability of small employers, which at least one analysis has concluded would bear most
of the cost of an employer mandate. 1 The Conservative Democratic Forum proposal
does not contain mandates and, while including provisions to increase the percentage of
the population covered, does not provide for coverage of the entire population. The
Clinton Proposal, however, relies upon an employer mandate and seeks to achieve
universal coverage.
EncouragingCost-ConsciousConsumers
Many question whether the tax reform suggested under managed competition proposals would be sufficient to significantly affect consumer behavior."3 It has been stated
that the existing research on the relationship between tax policy and the demand for
insurance, and on the relationship between insurance and the demand for health care
would suggest that the proposed changes in tax policy are likely to have relatively minor
effects, but the impact of insurance is not fully understood."
Some also argue that the imposition of costs through limiting employer contributions and taxing contributions in excess of the least expensive plans is inequitable
because it will in effect leave the less well-to-do with no choice but participating in the
lowest price plan. Arguably, this will create a two tier system with lower quality care of
those of lesser means and high quality available for those who can afford it. In addition,
the tax cap as a method is regressive since the provision of the same amount of excess
health benefits to the poor and the wealthy would result in the poor paying a larger
percentage of their income as taxes on those benefits than the wealthy.'
Other Elements Necessary in Reform Based on ManagedCompetition
Some of the issues that are considered to have a negative effect on health care costs
are not addressed by managed competition. Most notably, many consider physician
over-utilization of services to arise from the malpractice explosion and the resulting need
to practice defensive medicine.1 Thus, tort reform is considered by many a necessary
complement to health care reform based on managed competition.Y

2
U

u
S
"

EBRI, supra note 48, at 18.
See, e.g., Aaron & Schwartz, supra note 64, at 208; Fielding & Rice, supra note 10, at 226.
EBRI, supra note 48, at 20.
Id. at 21.
See, e.g., Decreasing Defensive Medical Practices Could Save $35.8 Billion Over Five Years, 2 HEALTH LAW

REP. 137 (Feb. 4, 1993).
'7 Id.
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Funding of graduate medical education and research will also need to be addressed.
Currently, these functions are financially supported by cost-shifting, with providers
including the costs of such items in their charges for health care. Price competition under
a managed competition system would make this practice unwise and thus it has been
suggested that some new methods of funding for these functions, which are beneficial
to society, will be needed.8 Funding of graduate medical education should also take into
account the need formore primary care physicians and fewer specialists, as noted above.
OPPONENT'S VIEWPOINT

Those who oppose managed competition as a basis for health care reform, in addition to raising the implementation issues discussed above, raise more basic questions

about the feasibility and likely effects of a managed competition system." Critics assert
that managed competition is an unproven theory that has never been tested in practice,
and that the economic pressures such a system would place on providers and consumers
would lead to lower quality and reduced access to health care.9° Doubts about the extent

to which managed competition would be effective in controlling escalating health care
costs are also widespread.

An Untested Theory
Representative Pete Stark, chair of the House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee, has referred to managed competition as a "fairy tale"; Representative Dan
Rostenkowski, chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, has compared it to
supply-side economics and the "Star Wars" defense initiative.91 The Congressional
Budget Office also has taken the position that managed competition is "untried."92 Such
concerns about the viability of managed competition arise from the inability of its
proponents to cite the health care system of any nation or state as an example of a
functioning managing competition system. Without such a functioning system to examine, it is impossible to be certain of the effects of such a system in practice.
Professor Enthoven has pointed to CaIPERS' experience as evidence that managed
competition will work, 93 and noted that the theory "is based on demonstrations of successful, high-quality, cost-effective, organized systems of care that have existed for
u Alan C. EnthovenManaged CompetitioninlealthCareandthe UnfmushedAgenda, 7 HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV. 105, 117 (1986 Annual Supp.).
"See, e.g., Experts Clash on Managed Competition in Testimony Before Senate Labor Panel, 1NAnON LAW REP.
421 (Dec. 21,1992).
90 Id.
91 Jill Wechsler, So You Think Reform is Going Slow Now? Wait Until Congress Gets a Hold of It, 3 MANAGED
HEALTHCARE NEWs, No. 6, at 1, 52 (June 1993).
CBO Rates Managed Competition, 21 HEALTH LAW. NEWS REP., No. 6, at 3 (June 1993).
See President's Health Care Reform, supra note 31, at Supp. p. 21.
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years", including, for example, Kaiser Permanente and Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound. 94 He argues, "All of the pieces of the managed care/managed competition
model are in actual successful practice somewhere. The challenge is to put these best
practices together into one complete managed competition system."
Effects on Access andQuality
Critics argue that managed competition will coerce consumers into "super-HMOs"
and deprive them ofphysician choice.96 ProfessorEnthovencounters that different types
of managed care organizations are contemplated, including selective independent practice models in which solo physicians could participate. 97 Thus, managed competition is
not intended to force all consumers into large clinic-model HMOs as many critics
suggest. 98 Further, he argues that individual choice is enhanced since consumers could
choose any plan offered through the HIPC in which they participate, rather than being
limited to the smaller number of plans offered by their particular employer.99 Nonetheless, managed competition as envisioned byProfessorEnthoven wouldlimitthe consumer's
choice to the physicians participating in the particular plan that the consumer selects.
Other criticisms of managed competition mirror criticisms that have been levelled
at managed care organizations - generally, that the economic interests of such organizations will outweigh the patients' interests, leading to undertreatment and discrimination against consumers with costly problems. Practices commonly used in the managed
care industry to incentivize physicians to control costs - such as risk pools, where a
portion of the physician's fee is withheld for later distribution only if economic targets
are achieved - are criticized for injecting economic concerns into treatment decisions and
eliminating the ability of physicians to make such decisions based solely on the patient's
needs."° An analysis of managed competition by the Congressional Budget Office
supports these criticisms, concluding that the dramatic restructuring required to control
costs under managed competition would mean less consumer choice, more limited
access to providers, fewer services and slower access to technology."'1
Managed competition proponents, however, point out that while charges "of
undertreatment have been leveled at managed care... no systematic detrimental effect
94 Enthoven, supra note 3,at 37.
Id. at 45.
9 See, e.g., Robin E. Margolis, Health Care Debate in Washington: Hare Realities Lurk Behind Clinton Reform
Hoopla, 10 HEALTH SPAN No. 2, at 21 (Jan. 1993); see also Reonald Bronow, HMO Physicians'Shared Risk Pools
Are Dangerous to Patients'Health, 10 HEALTH SPAN No. 1. at9 (Jan. 1993).
Enthoven, supra note 3, at 44.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Bronow, supra note 96.
IM CBO Rates Managed Competition, supra note 92,at 3.
'®
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on quality [under existing managed care programs] has been documented."' Professor
Enthoven further argues that the most economical medical care is often the highest
quality care since prompt diagnosis and proper treatment is both less expensive and
better for the patient than delays, misdiagnosis or inappropriate treatment"°
Effectiveness in ControllingCosts
Many who have analyzed managed competition, including the Congressional Budget Office, the Economic and Social Research Institute and the Employee Benefit Research Institute, have concluded that it is unlikely to significantly reduce spending, at
least in the short term, unless other measures such as budget caps are also used."°
Managed competition does not directly address some of the factors commonly blamed
for spiralling costs, such as an increasing elderly population, proliferation of medical
malpractice cases, and development ofexpensive new technologies. At least one analyst
has concluded that the main impetus for increasing health care costs is new technology
and, accordingly, that managed competition without cost controls will not slow the
increase in health care costs.0
Some argue that because the need to hold costs down is so important and the effects
of managed competition are uncertain, a global budget should also be used to assure cost
control. 10 Some of such proponents also argue that a global budget is compatible with
managed competition if it is imposed by limiting premiums for health care plans rather
than by regulating provider fees. "IWhile conceding that setting rates for providers may
be counterproductive under a managed competition system since this would tend to
"[freeze] in place the current composition of expenditures and thereby retard progressive
changes,"" and would give providers incentives to increase the volume and intensity
of services to compensate for lower rates, they argue that limiting capitated payments to
health plans would not cause such detrimental effects. 109 Rate-setting for providers is
suggested as a backup, however, to be used if managed competition combined with
premium limitations fails to adequately control costs and to be used for providers par-

2
10

Alan L Hillman etal, Safeguarding QualiylnManagedContition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 110,113-114.
Enthoven, supra note 3, at 44.

'
See Reports Raise Doubts About Potential of Reform Proposal to Reduce Spending, Health Care Pol'y Rep.
(BNA) 547,548 (May 24,1993).
10 See Joseph R Newhouse, An Iconoclastic view of Health Cost Containment, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993,at 152.
100 See, e.g., Paul Starr & Walter A. Zelman, A Bridge to Compromise: Competition Under a Budget, HEALTH
AFF., Supp. 1993, at 7, 14; see also Henry J. Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Managed Competition: Little Cost
Containment Without Budget Limits, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 204; see also Stuart H. Altman & Alan B. Cohen,
The Need for a National Global Budget, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 194.
107
Starr & Zelman, supranote 106, at 18-21.
11 Id. at 18.
'1

See id. at 18-20.
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ticipating in any indemnity/fee-for-service options and for areas in which the market
cannot support competition. 10 The Clinton Proposal provides for a global budget limiting premiums and premium increases and provides for HIPCs to negotiate fee schedules with fee-for-service plans.'
Professor Enthoven, however, argues that any global budgeting is inconsistent with
managed competition." 2 He asserts that even if global budgets are imposed through
capitation rates paid to health plans "they would focus the whole health services industry
on political efforts to raise or maintain the ceiling," would require costly administrative
procedures and hearings to be consistent with due process, and would dampen the
interest of managed care organizations in making necessary investments." 3 Ratherthan
use of such budget mandates, Professor Enthoven favors use of "targeted interventions"
such as reduction of covered benefits, increase ofcopayments and deductibles orchanges
in taxation ofpremiums after observation ofmanaged competition in practice and determination of the preferred method for reducing expenditures based on such observation."4
CURRENT LAWS AFFECnNO IMPLEMENTATION OF A

MANAGED COMPETITION SYSTEM
A number ofexisting federal and state laws would affect, and could create obstacles
to, the implementation of a managed competition health care delivery system. Accordingly, changes or developments in laws affecting the health care industry would likely
accompany the institution of managed competition health care reforms. A brief discussion of some of these laws follows.
Antitrust
Federal antitrust laws include prohibitions against contracts, combinations or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of trade (Sherman Act Section 1);15 monopolization,
attempted monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize (ShermanAct Section 2);111
tying and exclusive dealing arrangements that may substantially lessen competition
(Clayton Act Section 3); "1 and mergers, joint ventures, consolidations or acquisitions
that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly (Clayton Act
Section 7).118 State laws often prohibit similar conduct. Several activities by providers
11oId. at 20-21.
"'
112
"1
114

See President's Health Care Reform, supra note 31, at Supp. pp. 62,93-99.
Enthoven, supra note 3, at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43-44.

11 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1,26 stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1991)).

15 V.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1991).
,"7 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3,38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988)).
Ila 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
"1
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and payers in implementing a managed competition system could be subject to challenge
as violating these laws.
As discussed above, a HIPC that is the sole purchaser of health plans in its market
could be subject to a charge of exerting monopsony power in violation of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. 9 Thus, if a legislature intends HIPCs to be exclusive purchasers in
the markets and to exercise monopsony power, it will need to provide the HIPCs with
immunity from this charge. Most likely any such immunity would be coupled with
substitute regulation to avoid abuse of power by the HIPC. All three states enacting
managed competition reforms, as discussed below, have sought to provide such immunity and substitute regulation. 20
Even if not constituting a monopsony purchaser, a HIPC and its member employers
will have concerns under the antitrust laws. Most notably, since a HIPC will represent
a number of health plan purchasers, its decision to refuse to contract with an available
health plan could be challenged as an unlawful boycott under ShermanAct Section 1 and
similar state laws.
There are also risks to AHPs and their participants under antitrust laws."' If a
network has market power or a dominant share of the providers who participate in other
plans, it could subject to a claim under Sherman Act Section 2 Thus, although
Professor Enthoven envisions plans without overlapping panels of providers, plans may
be wary of prohibiting providers from participating in other plans. Further, if one type
of provider in an AHP, such as a hospital, is dominant in its market and directs referrals
to another provider in the AHP, such as a home health service, thereby increasing the
market share of the provider receiving the referrals, claims could be made that such
activities are a type of illegal tying arrangement or a prohibited leveraging of monopoly
power. In addition, providers in anAHPmust be cautious that the activities in which they
engage through the AHP cannot be characterized as resulting in an agreement among
those providers to fix prices.
When states enact health care reforms they may seek to provide some immunity to
prosecution underfederal antitrustlaws to HIPCs,AHPs orboth, underthe "state action"
doctrine. 3 This doctrine provides private parties with antitrust immunity for their
activities if there is a clearly enunciated state policy to supplant competition in favor of
the subject activities and significant state involvement in the activities.1 As discussed
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
"I See infra pp. 26-33.
121 See Blue Cross of Wash. and Alaska v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 64588 (W.D.
19

Wash. 1981).
13
Id.
12
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S.Ct. 2169,2176-77 (1992).
12A See id.
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below, states enacting health care reforms based on managed competition have included
provisions intended to take advantage ofthe state action doctrine3 5 The effectiveness of such
provisions in triggering application of the doctrine has not been judicially tested, however.
The Clinton Proposal contemplates publication of guidelines by the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission establishing "safety zones," exemplar of arrangements among providers that will not be considered violative of antitrust laws, and
an expedited business review or advisory opinion procedure through which providers
can get a response within 90 days concerning whether proposed ventures outside the
safety zones will be challenged. 126 On September 15, 1993, a document entitled "Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in the Health Care Area" was issued by those
agencies establishing safety zones with respect to certain hospital mergers, hospital joint
ventures involving high technology equipment, physicians' provision of information to
purchasers of health care services, hospitals' exchange of price and cost information,
joint purchasing arrangements and physician network joint ventures."z The Clinton
Proposal also contemplates a narrow safe harbor for providers to establish and negotiate
prices if they share financial risk and the publication of guidelines clarifying application
of the state action doctrine. 12
Tax-Exempt Entities
Many participants in the health care industry, especially hospitals, are non-profit,
charitable institutions exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 (c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Such tax-exempt entities will have significant concerns that
their relationships with AHPs not jeopardize their tax-exempt status. Further, it is
expected that hospitals, physicians and other providers will become vertically integrated
to an increasing extent so that they can offer a full range of services and bargain as a unit
in formation of AHPs. Issues arise concerning tax exemption of independent, taxexempt entities participating in such vertically integrated systems and concerning the
ability of the system itself to obtain tax exemption.
The test applied in determining tax exemption of a hospital is the community benefit
standard enunciated in Revenue Ruling 69-545.29 Factors necessary to establish community benefit include maintenance of an open medical staff, with staff privileges
available to all qualified physicians in the area; operation of a full-time emergency room
treating all person regardless of ability to pay; provision of cae to all persons able to pay

Id. at 2175. See also infra pp. 26-33.
See President'sHealth Care Reform, supranote 31, at 167-70.
m JusticelFTC Antitrust Guidelinesfor Health CareIndustry 2 Health Law Rep. (BNA) 1265 (Sept. 23, 1993).
123 See President'sHealthCare Reform, supranote 31, at 170.

'I
'

'2

Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2C.B. 117, 118.
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directly or through private insurance or government programs; and use of surplus to
improve quality of patient care, expand facilities and advance medical training, education and research." 30 This standard would pose a difficulty for a tax-exempt hospital
seeking to participate in an AHP if the AHP is intended to have a separate pool of
providers that do not participate in any other plans or accept referrals from physicians
outside the AHP. Most notably, the requirement for an open medical staff is directly at
odds with the managed care staffmodel structure favored byProfessorEnthoven. Further,
while the Internal Revenue Service has recently granted favorable letter rulings to two
systems with integrated hospital and physician practices, it has sought to apply this
community benefit standard in doing so, including application of the requirement for
maintenance of an open medical staff."'
In seeking to form integrated systems, entities that are tax-exempt under Section
501(c)(3) also will need to be particularly mindful that their arrangements comply with
the private inurement and private benefit restrictions applicable to them." Under these
restrictions, no part of the net earnings of such a tax-exempt entity may inure to the
benefit of a private shareholder or individual including, in the case of a hospital, any
member of its medical staff.33 In addition, ifthe private benefit to an individual of a taxexempt hospital's transaction is more than incidental to the accomplishment of public
benefits, the tax-exempt status of the hospital will be at risk." Thus, transactions with
physicians and with other for-profit entities will have to be undertaken carefully to assure
those parties do not benefit inappropriately from the transactions.
Last, it should be noted that the Internal Revenue Service has recently taken the
position that activities in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, discussed below, also
jeopardize the tax-exempt status of entities involved."
Anti-Kickback and Self-ReferralLaws
The MedicareAnti-Kickback Statute imposes criminal penalties on any entity which
"knowingly or wilfully" pays or offers to pay, or solicits or receives, any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe orrebate) directly or indirectly, overtly orcovertly, incash
or in-kind in exchange for the referral of patients for any item or service which is covered
in whole or in part by Medicare or a state health care program, such as Medicaid."' The
130 Id.

13 Letter from Marvin Friedlander, Chief, Exempt Organizations Rulings, Branch 1, I.R.S., to Peter N. Grant,
attorney representing Friendly Hills HealthCare Network df/ba Friendly Hills HealthCare Foundation (Jan. 29,1993);
letter from Jeanna s. Gessay, Chief, Exempt Organizations Rulings, Branch 2, I.R.S., to Facey Medical Foundation
c/o Don Abramsky (Mar. 31, 1993)( on file with author).
- I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (1988).
'
See id.; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39, 862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
11
See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39, 862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
13

u

Id.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (b) (2) (1988).
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existence of a valid business purpose for an arrangement is not sufficient to establish that
the statute has not been violated, since a violation occurs if one of the purposes is to
induce referrals. 1 Violation of the statute carries a criminal penalty, and civil sanctions
also may be imposed. 13 Certain relationships and transactions specified in the statute
or in regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, including bona fide employment arrangements and personal service contracts meeting specified criteria, are immune from risk of civil of criminal prosecution. 139
The Ethics in Patient Referral Act of 1989, as amended by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993140 (the "Stark Bill") prohibits physicians from making referrals to entities in which they have an ownership interest or with which they have 4a1
compensation arrangement for the provision of certain enumerated items or services.
The enumerated items and services currently consist of clinical laboratory services, and
effective after December 31, 1994, will include physical and occupational therapy,
radiology and other diagnostic services, radiation therapy, medical equipment and prosthetics, parenteral and enteral supplies, home health services, outpatient prescription
drugs and inpatient and outpatient hospital services covered by Medicare orMedicaid. 42
The Stark Bill provides exceptions to this prohibition for certain arrangements, including
bona fine employment relationships and personal service arrangements meeting specified criteria. 143 Many states have enacted similar referral prohibitions that apply regardless of whether the service is covered by Medicare or Medicaid.
If a managed competition system is created in which providers are divided into
vertically integrated, competing AHPs, physicians will undoubtedly be encouraged or
required to refer patients only to other providers in their AHP. Thus, arrangements
between physicians and AHPs or other providers in the same AHP will need careful
structuring to meet the requirements of an exception to the Stark Bill and a safe harbor
under the Anti-Kickback Statute. In addition, it may be necessary to qualify such
arrangements for an exception from similar state statutes.
The Clinton Proposal would expand the Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Bill to
cover all payers and all services, but would provide a safe harbor to the Anti-Kickback

7

United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68,72 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (e) (1988).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (b) (3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 42 C.ER. § 1001.952 (1992).
42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991); as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
'
L 103-66, Title XII, § 13562 (a), 107 Stat 596,602, 604.
141
Id.
'

"

'a

Id.

143 Id.
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Statute and an exception to the Stark Bill for payments made on an at-risk basis, such as
44
capitated payments, to providers and health plans.'
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974141("ERISA") was enacted
by Congress to establish minimum standards for private employee retirement and fringe
benefit plans.146 It does not mandate provision of any specific benefits or regulate the
substantive content of benefit plans.14 Because employer-sponsored health benefit
plans are subject to ERISA, it may be expected that any federal health care reform based
on managed competition would include changes to ERISA.
More importantly, ERISA contains broad provisions preempting state laws that
"relate to" employee benefit plans, with the exception of a narrow listing of particular
state laws (including insurance laws).148 State attempts to mandate the benefits to be
provided by plans subject to ERISA have been held to be preempted. 149 Thus, provisions
of Washington's managed competition reform legislation, discussed below, which seek
to require employers to provide health care coverage are subject to the state obtaining
an exemption from ERISA permitting such a mandate."s Further, state efforts to obtain
funding for expanding health care coverage have been subject to ERISA challenge.' 5'
For example, a Louisiana District Court held that ERISA preempted application to
ERISA plans of a Louisiana statute establishing a catastrophic health insurance program
and providing for that program to be funded through collection of hospital service
charges from insurance arrangements, insurers and self-insurers. 52 Similarly, a tax
assessed on hospitals under Minnesota's reform plans, discussed below, which the hospitals are initially permitted to pass on to third-party payers, has been challenged under
ERISA on the grounds that it requires ERISA plans to fund the provision of benefits to
people who are not plan participants.5 3 Clearly, ERISA poses a significant impediment
to states seeking to enact health care reforms based on a managed competition model.
The Clinton Proposal would establish a new chapter or title of ERISA regarding
health benefit plans through corporate alliances and would not apply current provisions
14

See President'sHealth Care Reform, supra note 31, at 173.

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended in
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
'"
See id. § 1001 (c).
'4

14
4

See id. §§ 1001-1461.

29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (1988).

But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985).
See infra pp. 26-33.
151 Bricklayers Local No. I Welfare Fund v. Louisiana Health Ins. Ass'n., 771 F Supp. 771 (E.D. La. 1991).
'

i

1-, Id. at 776.
155 Complaint, Boyle v Anderson, (D.C. Minn. June 3, 1993)(No. 3-93-359)(on file with author).
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of ERISAto health benefit plans. The ERISApreemption provision would be modified
to apply only to corporate alliances, permit non-discriminatory taxes or assessments on
employers or health plans in corporate alliances, permit states to develop all-payer rates
and permit states to require all payers to reimburse essential community providers.'
State Laws
Insurance Laws
The regulation of insurance has been traditionally controlled by the states. There are
a number of different state laws affecting health insurers and managed care organizations, including laws mandating provisions of various benefits in policies, requiring
managed care organizations to permit participation of all willing providers in their plans,
and affecting methods of underwriting and rating insurance policies. Federal health care
reforms based on managed competition would preempt application of certain of these state
laws and probably shift at least some traditionally state functions to the federal govenment.
Corporate Practice of Medicine
Laws in a number of states prohibit corporations (other than professional corporations owned solely by licensed physicians) from engaging in the practice of medicine. 55
Such laws may hamper vertical integration of providers by preventing health care entities from employing physicians to treat patients and, thus, requiring physicians to
maintain independent entities. The Clinton Proposal would preempt application of
corporate practice of medicine to arrangements between integrated health plans and
their participating providers. '6
STATE LEGISLATION BASED ON MANAGED COMPETITION
Despite uncertainties concerning the nature offederal health care reform, states have
been moving forward with their own reform measures. Some of those states have based
their reforms on managed competition, at least in part. Although none of such legislation
has been in effect long enough to provide insights into managed competition in practice,
a brief review of such legislation gives some insights into the variations based on managed competition that are politically viable and the approaches that are being taken in
addressing some of the implementation issues discussed above.

'

See President's Health Care Reform, supra note 31, at 72-73.

l

See Catherine Dunlay & Mark Peterson, Corporate Practice of Medicine, 2 HEALTH U. 01110 Issue 5, at 105

(Mar./Apr. 1991).
156 See President's Health Care Reform, supra note 31, at 77.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol27/iss2/3

26

Dunlay and Pavarini: Managed Competition

Fall, 1993]

1MANAGED COMPETrnON

FloridaLegislation
To develop a program of managed competition, Florida's Health Care and Insurance
Reform Act of 1993' 57 (the "Florida Reform") uses Florida's existing eleven health
planning districts as health care delivery regions.158 Each region will have a Community
Health PurchasingAlliance ("CHPA"), which will serve as a broker or facilitator to assist
members in purchasing health insurance from Accountable Health Partnerships
("ABPs").-1 9 The CHPAs will be nonprofit, private corporations with board members
appointed by the Governor, the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. 160
CHPAboard members will be prohibited from having any connection with a health care
16
provider or insurer. '
The CHPAs will establish conditions of alliance membership, provide alliance
members with information on price, quality, patient satisfaction, and enrollee responsibilities for each AHP, and provide purchasing services for alliance members.' 62 Only
small employers (with 50 or fewer employees) located within the boundaries of a CHPA
are eligible to participate as purchasers, except that the state is authorized to participate
for the purpose of purchasing health care for state employees.' 63 Employer participation
in a CHPA is voluntary; the Florida reform does not require any employers to offer
insurance to employees or to participate in a CHPA.' 64 Small employers participating
in a CHPA are not required to pay any portion of premiums for their employees or their
employees' dependents, but if an employer does contribute to their coverage, the employermustcontribute the same dollar amount regardless oftheAHPchosen.'65 Employers participating in a CHPA that have thirty or fewer employees must offer at least two AHPs,
and such employers that have more than thirty employees must offer at least three AHPs.'6
CHPAs are required to offer their participating employees all health plans offered
by AHPs that submit responsive proposals and provide all requested information. 67
CHPAs also are to ensure that any health plan reasonably available in their jurisdiction,

,s Health Careand Insurance Reform Act of 1993,1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-129 (amending FLA. STAT. ch. 627(1992)).
'
Id.§68.
Id.§66.
,
I § 74.
Id.
16
Ia

Id.

Id.§68.
Id.
Ia

Id.
I6

,'

Id.§ 69.
I' Id.

167 Id.§68.
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including PPO, HMO and other managed cam organization products, plus indemnity
products, is offered to their members.'6 In addition, CHPAs are responsible for developing aplanto facilitate participationof providers, especially minority physicians, in anAHP.6
AHPs may be created by health care providers, HMOs and insurers. '0 AnAHPmust
be licensed by the Florida Department of Insurance as either a health insurer or an
HMO.7 Each AHP must report its cost and outcome date to the Florida Agency for
Health Care Administration (the "Agency"), 72 which will be responsible for certifying
the CHPAs and AHPs, developing comparison sheets, and establishing a standardized
data collection system.17 For networks formed after July 1, 1993, an AHP must make
offers to health care providers who have practiced for more than one year in the AHP's
district for at least sixty percent of its available provider positions. 74 This provision,
which precludes AHPs from satisfying their recruiting needs with recent graduates and
physicians brought in from outside of the area, was lobbied for by the Florida
175
Medical Association.
Under the Florida Reform insurers and HMOs issuing policies to small employers
must issue those policies on a guaranteed issue basis, without regard to health status, preexisting conditions or claims history, although benefits in addition to statutorily defined
standard benefit plans may be offered through riders to such plans, and such riders may
be medically underwritten. 76 In addition, the Florida Reform applies a modified community rating standard to small employer policies.'7 Rates may be adjusted based on
age, gender, family composition, tobacco usage, and geographiclocation; however, rates
7
may not be based on health status or claims experience of any individual or group."
The Florida Reform includes a provision requiring the Agency to actively supervise
CHPAs to ensure that actions affecting market competition further the intent of the
Florida Reform. 179 This provision is intended to provide the CHPAs with antitrust
immunity, including immunity from prosecution under federal law pursuant to the state
action doctrine.'m Similar protection is not afforded to AHPs, although the Agency is
16
14

Id.
Id.

I-

Id.§ 77.

171 Id.
1-2 Id.

1'

Id.§ 70.
Id. § 77.

'7

Terese Hudson, FloridaHealth Care, HOsp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Aug. 5, 1993, at 38, 42.

,76 Id.§ 65.
17

Id.
Id.

17

See id. § 70.

im0

Id. § 71.
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directed to study antitrust issues related to AHPs and cooperative arrangements
among physicians."8
The Florida Reform also created MedAccess, a new state health insurance program
for residents with incomes below 250% of the federal poverty level who have no private
health insurance for the previous year. 182 Premiums are to be paid by individuals and/
or their employers without government subsidy.'83 Health care providers providing4
services to MedAccess patients will be reimbursed at applicable Medicaid rates. 8
MedAccess is intended to focus on primary care and prevention and to improve access
to basic health care without waiting for federal Medicaid waivers and state and federal
funding. 85 Federal approval to establish a Medicaid buy-in program for individuals
18 6
below 250% of the federal poverty level will be sought.
MinnesotaLegislation
In 1992, Minnesota enacted MinnesotaCare, 18 7 which created a new health care
commission, instituted small employer and individual insurance reforms, set forth data
collection initiatives and established an insurance program for low income residents and
children. 88 MinnesotaCare also established a Private Employers Insurance Program, to
be administered by a state agency, through which private employers would be given
access to the purchasing power of a large pool." 9
Minnesota's 1993 health care reform law, the Minnesota Integrated Service Network Act,190 provides for the creation of Integrated Service Networks ("ISNs") that will
be responsible for arranging for or delivering a full array of health care services. 191 An
ISN may be organized as a separate nonprofit corporation or as a cooperative and can
be formed by health care providers, HMOs, insurance companies, employers or other
organizations.'9 The networks can be established after July 1, 1994.193

IId. § 75.
I19Id. § 41.
1

Id.§ 45.
Id.§ 47.

'

See id. § 42.

1

I6d. § 41.

15

Health Right Act, 1992 Minn. Laws ch. 549.
ld. Art. 1.
Id. Arn. III, §1.
Integrated Service Networks Act, 1993 Minn. Laws ch. 345 (will amend MINN. STAT. §§ 62A-62N).

IV

10
10
11*
191

Id. Art. I, § 2.

192 Id.

19

Id. § 24.
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Employers of any size may choose to join the purchasing pool established under
MinnesotaCare, and no employers are required to participate. 194 Similarly, health care
providers are not required to participate in an ISN.' 95 Moreover, providers will be
permitted to participate in more than one network and to serve both patients who are
covered by an ISN and those who are not. 196
By January 15,1994, the Minnesota CommissioneroffHealth(the "Commissioner")
is required to submit to the legislature and the governor a detailed ISN implementation
plan which includes rules and legislation. 97 The implementation plan must encourage
competition among ISNs through the collection and distribution of reliable information
on the cost, prices, and quality of each. Each ISN will be required to offer up to five
standarized benefit plans which will be defined by the Commissioner. 9 The plans will
vary in the amount of their premiums and enrollee cost sharing. 199
Cost control through global budgeting is akey feature of the Minnesota statutes. The
Commissioner is required to establish an annual limit on the rate of growth of public and
private spending in health care services.2° ISNs will be required to offer services at a
capitated rate not exceeding a maximum rate to be established by the Commissioner?"
Providers who do notparticipate in ISNs will become part of a regulated all-payer system
to be phased in overtwo years beginning July 1994.2m That system will include controls
on payments to providers, such as fee schedules or rate limits, to be established by
the Commissioner.2 3
MinnesotaCare requires carriers offering insurance to small employers to offer two
plans specified in the statute and to issue plans to any small employer (with two to 29
employees) without regard to health status.20 Similarly, the ISNs will be required to offer
health care services and coverage to all Minnesota residents and will be prohibited from
refusing coverage to any individuals or groups because of pre-existing conditions or
health status.2' The networks' enrollment standards must ensure that high risk and
special needs populations will be included, and growth limits and payment systems must
19' 1992 Minn. Laws ch. 541,Art lII, § 1; see alsoChristine B Moore, HealthRight:Fillingthe Gapsina High-Access
State, NAT'L CivIC REV., Spring-Summer 1992, at 137, 141.
195 Id.§6.
196

Id.

19

Id. § 1.
Id. § 12.

1-

199 Id.
2m
201

Id. Art. 1, § 5.
See id.

20

Id. Art. 11, § 2.

'
204

Id.

2W

1992Minn. Laws ch. 549,Art. 11,§5.
1993 Minn. Laws ch. 345, Art I, § 6. Subd. 3(d).
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be designed to provide incentives for networks to enroll even the most challenging and
costly groups and populations. 206
The Minnesota statutes include provisions for review of proposed arrangements
among purchasers or providers by the state and grant of antitrust immunity to arrangements found to further the legislative intent.m Such immunity is intended to include
immunity from prosecution under federal law pursuant to the state action doctrine.
The Minnesota reforms are intended to encourage small businesses to provide
insurance to employees, but do not provide for universal coverage. 2m A subsidized
minimum benefit insurance package for low-income families was established, however,
to expand coverage. Several approaches were used to pay the costs of the Minnesota
programs, including a gross revenue tax on hospitals, physicians and other providers and
a cigarette tax. Hospitals are permitted to pass the cost of the tax on to payers until 1994
and are prohibited from doing so thereafter.
Washington Legislation
The goal of Washington's Health Services Act of 1993m9 (the "Washington Reform") is to cover all Washington residents under a basic package of health benefits.21
The statute requires all persons living in Washington to purchase at least a Uniform
Benefit Package ("UBP") by 1999 (subject to certain exceptions for religious objections). If Congress exempts Washington employers from ERISA, employers will be
required to offer at least three Certified Health Plans and pay at least 50% of the premium
forthe UBPforeachemployee and theirdependents. 21 1 IfWashington residents are lowincome, the State will pay part of the premium. 212 In addition, government-administered
programs including a Basic Health Plan, First Steps and Medicaid will be expanded to
enroll adults and children below 200% of the federal poverty level.2 13
As part of the Washington Reform, the Health Services Commission ("HSC") is
created to design the UBP, which will be the minimum level of coverage, the optional

Id.
I2

1992 Minn Laws ch. 549, Art I, § 14; 1993 Minn. Laws ch. 345, Art IV, § 14.
1992 Minn. Laws ch. 549,Art. II, § 3; 1993 Minn. Laws ch. 345, Art. I, § 6, Subd.(d); see also Barbara P. Yawn,
M.D. et al., Minnesota Care (HealthRight) Myths & Miracles, 269 JAMA 511 (Jan. 27, 1993).
19 Health Services Act, 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492.
210 Id. § 102.
211 Id. § 464.
212

Id.

213

Id.
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supplemental benefit packages. 2 4 The HSC will15also set the maximum premiums that
2
a Certified Health Plan can charge for the UBP.
The law provides that afterJuly 1995, only risk-bearing managed care organizations
which are state-Certified Health Plans ("CHPs") will be permitted to offer insurance in
Washington. 216 In order to be certified, a plan must offer the UBP through managed care
arrangements for no more than the maximum premium set by the HSC, enroll anyone
who desires to enroll (regardless of age or health status), and charge community rated
premiums with modification for geographic and family size differences. 217 CHPs also
will be required to publish selection criteria for providers and give every category of
provider the opportunity to participate. 218 Health insurance issued prior to the July 1995
effective date of this requirement will be subject to similar reforms, including restrictions
on the use of pre-existing condition limitations and prohibitions against cancellation or
nonrenewal of policies because of health status.2 19
Private employers will have several options to provide their employees with a UBP.
First, employers with more than 7,000 employees could run their own CHP, called a
registered employer health plan. Second, employers could contract directly with CHPs.
Third, they could directly purchase coverage through the state's Basic Health Plan at the
full cost if they do not already offer more comprehensive insurance.' Finally, employers could join a Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperative ("HIPC") to reduce administrative burdens and to increase their buying power." A Small Business Assistance
Fund is created to assist employers with 25 or fewer employees meet their obligations.tm
Larger employers will be the first to be phased into Washington's reform system.
Businesses with more than 500 employees will have to provide coverage for employees
by July 1995 and their employees' dependents by July 1996.22 Employers with between
100 and 499 employees will have until July 1996 for their employees and until July 1997
fortheir employees' dependents.22 Employers with fewer than 100 employees will have

214 Id. § 403.
21

Id. § 406.

216

Id.
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until July 1997 to provide benefits; dependents of employees in these small companies
will not have to be covered until 1999.1
The Washington Reform creates HIPCs, nonprofit organizations that are member
owned and governed, in each of four geographic regions.2 The HIPCs will be regulated
by the Insurance Commissioner.?7 HIPCs must allow any group or individual in the
region to join, offer every CHP in the region, collect information on CHPs, conduct
enrollments, and collect premiums.?
A statewide health data system including information on cost, quality and outcome
is to be created, and the Washington Department of Health is to develop reports for
consumers based on this data.229
These reforms will be financed, in part, by phased-in tax increases on alcohol and
tobacco products. 2 ° Revenue will also be created by a phased-in business and occupation tax on nonprofit hospitals and new taxes on HMOs, health care service contractors, and CHPs.231
The Washington Reform provides for regulation and oversight of providers and
CHPs to protect competition and promote choice. Actions furthering the legislative
intent are granted immunity from prosecution understate antitrust laws and, pursuant to
the state action doctrine, under federal antitrust laws.
HOW THESE STATES HAVE USED MANAGED COMPETITION
Certain elements of Professor Enthoven's managed competition model are present
in the reforms of all three of these states. All of them provide for creation of HIPCs and
AHPs, although not necessarily in the form envisioned by Enthoven. All three also
establish some type of standard benefit package. 23 Further, all three eliminate experience rating (at least in the small employer market) and require issuance of insurance
without regard to health status.2 3 Last, all three establish programs for collecting cost
and quality data and providing that information to consumers.
None of the state models reviewed, however, is entirely consistent with Enthoven's
model and, in fact, all of them include features Enthoven describes as contrary to manIId.

Id. Part .
22

Id.

=3 Id. Part 1.
Id.

o
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See id. Part Ill.

2m

Id.
See supratext pp. 26-33 and notes 157-231.

2n3

See supranotes 157-23 1.
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aged competition and/or fail to include features Enthoven describes as critical components. The reforms in Minnesota and Washington are both characterized by government
budgets and price restraints, which Enthoven considers incompatible with managed
competition. Both Florida and Washington require HIPCs to give all AHPs the ability
to participate, thus limiting the ability of HIPCs to negotiate selectively. Florida's
program expressly includes indemnity plans, and none of the three programs appear
likely to create mutually exclusive, competing provider groups. Finally, only one of the
three, Washington, mandates universal coverage. 214 It is reasonable to conjecture that the
urgent need to control costs, the costliness of providing universal coverage and concern
about the interests of providers, insurers and employers underlie such deviations from
Professor Enthoven's managed competition model.
CONCLUSION
There is widespread agreement that the current health care system in the United
States is badly in need of reform. The reform plan proposed by the Clinton Administration, while not a pure managed competition system, incorporates versions of some of its
key components, including HIPCs, universal coverage, community rating and continuous coverage, a standard benefit package and dissemination of cost and quality information. Accordingly, the debate conceming the feasibility, effectiveness and cost of such
measures can be expected to continue and to intensify.

23

See supra notes 157-231.
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